Fukushima raises grave nuclear power doubts

 

The Fukushima nuclear plant cleanup in Japan is expected to take decades. /IAEA image

 

Over the past six months, several informative reports have been released on the Fukushima nuclear disaster, including a status report from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Japanese legislature's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigations Commission report. The Independent Investigations Commission report provides a well-written and shockingly frank account of the disaster, the manmade failings that contributed to it and the daunting cleanup challenges ahead.

 

The excerpts from the Independent Investigations Commission report below should raise red flags at countries around the world that have nuclear power plants. Is the relationship between nuclear power plant owners and regulators too cozy? Are there proper procedures and resources in place in the event of a severe nuclear disaster? Are there adequate evacuation plans to help members of the public escape a nuclear plant disaster?

 

As someone who has been following the U.S. nuclear industry since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, I believe American society could benefit greatly from the same kind of nuclear power soul searching that is under way in Japan.

 

While working as a Connecticut Citizen Action Group fund-raiser in the 1980s, I had a lengthy discussion with a former U.S. Navy nuclear engineer who made a convincing case that regulation of U.S. military nuclear reactors was far more strict and effective than regulation of reactors under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal agency charged with making sure civilian reactors are safe. The veteran said he and his crewmates had their careers on the line every time Navy inspectors visited their ships; he openly ridiculed NRC inspections.

 

After living within two miles of the Pilgrim nuclear power plant in Plymouth, Mass., and covering the Pilgrim plant and the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire as a journalist, I have grave concerns about U.S. evacuation plans. For example, in the case of a nuclear disaster at Pilgrim, the evacuation plan for Cape Cod essentially calls for residents to hunker down in their homes as their communities are bathed in radioactive fallout. 

 

EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE LEGISLATURE'S FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS COMMISSION REPORT:

 

Chairman's introductory remarks:

 

THE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI of March 11, 2011, were natural disasters of a magnitude that shocked the entire world. Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response. ...

 

What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.” Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity. ...

 

Following the 1970s “oil shocks,” Japan accelerated the development of nuclear power in an effort to achieve national energy security. As such, it was embraced as a policy goal by government and business alike, and pursued with the same single-minded determination that drove Japan’s postwar economic miracle.

With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion. At a time when Japan’s self-confidence was soaring, a tightly knit elite with enormous financial resources had diminishing regard for anything ‘not invented here.’

This conceit was reinforced by the collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy, by which the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend the interests of his organization. Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their paramount duty to protect public safety. ...

 

The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that supported it can be found across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us should reflect on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society.

With their white protective gear, a TEPCO crew works inside one of the devastated reactor buildings at the Fukushima nuclear plant. /Image via BBC
 

 

Independent Investigations Commission report conclusions:

 

The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly “manmade.” We believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of any specific individual.

 

The direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to March 11, 2011. But the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami that hit on that day. The operator (TEPCO), the regulatory bodies (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Nuclear Safety Commission) and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements — such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release. ...

 

Since 2006, the regulators and TEPCO were aware of the risk that a total outage of electricity at the Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were to reach the level of the site. They were also aware of the risk of reactor core damage from the loss of seawater pumps in the case of a tsunami larger than assumed in the Japan Society of Civil Engineers estimation. NISA knew that TEPCO had not prepared any measures to lessen or eliminate the risk, but failed to provide specific instructions to remedy the situation. ...

 

There were many opportunities for taking preventive measures prior to March 11. The accident occurred because TEPCO did not take these measures, and NISA and the Nuclear Safety Commission went along. They either intentionally postponed putting safety measures in place, or made decisions based on their organization’s self interest, and not in the interest of public safety. ...

 

Although the two natural disasters — the earthquake and subsequent tsunami — were the direct causes of the accident, there are various points in the unfolding of the event that remain unresolved. The main reason for this is that almost all the equipment directly related to the accident is inside the reactor containers, which are inaccessible and will remain so for many years. A complete examination and full analysis are impossible at this time.

TEPCO was quick, however, to assign the accident cause to the tsunami, and state that the earthquake was not responsible for damage to equipment necessary for safety (although it did add, “to the extent that has been confirmed,” a phrase that also appears in TEPCO reports to the government and to the IAEA). However, it is impossible to limit the direct cause of the accident to the tsunami without substantive evidence. The Commission believes that this is an attempt to avoid responsibility by putting all the blame on the unexpected (the tsunami), as they wrote in their midterm report, and not on the more foreseeable earthquake. ...

 

The Commission concludes that there were organizational problems within TEPCO. Had there been a higher level of knowledge, training, and equipment inspection related to severe accidents, and had there been specific instructions given to the on-site workers concerning the state of emergency within the necessary time frame, a more effective accident response would have been possible. ...

 

The government, the regulators, TEPCO management, and the [Prime Minister's Office] lacked the preparation and the mindset to efficiently operate an emergency response to an accident of this scope. None, therefore, were effective in preventing or limiting the consequential damage. ...

 

The Commission concludes that the residents’ confusion over the evacuation stemmed from the regulators’ negligence and failure over the years to implement adequate measures against a nuclear disaster, as well as a lack of action by previous governments and regulators focused on crisis management. The crisis management system that existed for the [Prime Minister's Office] and the regulators should protect the health and safety of the public, but it failed in this function.

 

The central government was not only slow in informing municipal governments about the nuclear power plant accident, but also failed to convey the severity of the accident. Similarly, the speed of information in the evacuation areas varied significantly depending on the distance from the plant. Specifically, only 20 percent of the residents of the town hosting the plant knew about the accident when evacuation from the 3km zone was ordered at 21:23 on the evening of March 11. ...

 

The Commission recognizes that the residents in the affected area are still struggling from the effects of the accident. They continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles, and the contamination of vast areas of the environment. There is no foreseeable end to the decontamination and restoration activities that are essential for rebuilding communities. The Commission concludes that the government and the regulators are not fully committed to protecting public health and safety; that they have not acted to protect the health of the residents and to restore their welfare.

 

Approximately 150,000 people were evacuated in response to the accident. An estimated 167 workers were exposed to more than 100 millisieverts of radiation while dealing with the accident. It is estimated that as much as 1,800 square kilometers of land in Fukushima Prefecture has now been contaminated by a cumulative radiation dose of 5 millisieverts or higher per year. Insufficient evacuation planning led to many residents receiving unnecessary radiation exposure. Others were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and health risks — including deaths among seriously ill patients. ...

 

The Commission has concluded that the safety of nuclear energy in Japan and the public cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformation process. The entire organization needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in a substantial way. Japan’s regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring international safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity. ...

 

TEPCO did not fulfil its responsibilities as a private corporation, instead obeying and relying upon the government bureaucracy of (the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), the government agency driving nuclear policy. At the same time, through the auspices of the (Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan), it manipulated the cozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations.